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The one megawatt swimming pool type1 research reactor
at the University of Michigan recently (September 19, 1957)
went into operation. At present, the reactor is operating at
low power levels for the purposes of reactor and control
system calibrations,
The Ford Nuclear Reactor2 was designed to provide
facilities for a broad comprehensive educational prograi in
conjunction with a highly diversified research program. The
control system for such a reactor must be characterized by
simplicity and flexIbility of operation while providing a
high degree of safety, protection and reliability. The
installed control system, designed in 1954, is similar to
that for the original Bulk ShieldIng Facility3 a-t the Oak
Ridge National Laboratozy.
DESCRIPTION 01? rr CONTROL_SYSTEM
There are four types of instrumentation channels
that provide information about conditions within the reactor
to the control system: namely, the pulse or start-up channel,
the linear servo channel the log N-period channel, and the
safety channels.. Fig0 I shows the Instrument Block Diagram
for the Ford Nuclear Reactor0 These channels designed by
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, are similar or identical to
those used on other reactors, such as the R’5, ETh, LITR
and GGR8 Since much has been written about these instruments
elsewhere there is little need to describe them here
The safety actions initiated by the Ford Nuclear
Reactor control system are, in order of importance:
etSc
There are two level safety channels in the system
which electronically decreases the currents to the three
electromagnets, thus permitting the three shimsafety rods
to he dropped into the reactor These channels are the primary
safety channels for the reactor and are independent of the
rest of the control system0 This independence prevents
safety compromise due to control system interaction0 The
level safety channels are set to secram the reactor at a
power level of 150 per cent of full power0
riet Scram
The one period safety channel on the FNR receives
its information from the lag N channel. Since log N information
is critically dependent on the degree of compensation of
its detector and because the log N channel is not completely
nonitored for component failures as are the level safety
channels, period safety can only be considered as secondary to
the level safety channels Control system interactions could
conceivably compromise the protection offered by the log N
channel, therefore cognizance of this fact must enter any
discussion or establishment of period safety criteria. This
channel will electronically reduce the magnet currents and
hence, “scram” the reactor at periods of 5 seconds or less.
30 Automatic Interlock Serams
Shutdowns from the interlock type of control system
action are considered “slow scram1’ in that the power supplies
for the electromagnets are turned off. This action is
slower than the “fast” or electronic switching as described
above and is, therefore, used to shutdown the reactor (ox
prevent the reactor from going into operation) when conditions
exist requiring shutdown but not on an urgent basis. Action
of this type in no way approaches the degree of safety pro
tection provided by the level safety system0 There are numerous
interlocks thatperform this “slow scram” action on the FNR
such as high radiation level in the building, inadequate
cooling, etc.
4. Automatic Rundown or_Reverse
Driving the three shimsafety rods into the reactor
by motor control is considered a mild form of safety action.
The Automatic Rundown function adequately handles minor
reactor excursions for which the more drastic action of scram
is unnecessary and, indeed, undesirable. On the FNR, auto
tnatic rundown is initiated .f the period becomes 10 seconds
or less and/or the linear level reaches 135 per cent of the
full scale value selected. The latter provides safety action
over a wide range of reactor power levels.
5, Restriction of Control Rod Withdrawal
Should the reactor attain a period of 30 seconds
or less, further withdrawal of the control rod by either
manual or automatic servo control is prohibited. This
feature provides reasonable assurance that the reactor,
under normal conditions, will not be able to attain a period
less than 30 seconds, the shortest permissible operating
period This actIon is desirable in that it provides a
reminder for the not.too—attentive” operator.
DISCUSSION OP CONTROL SYSTEM
Inasmuch as there were several delays before the
reactor was put into operation due to the innate perversities
of inanimate objects considerable time was available and
devoted to testing and evaluating the control system performance0
As a result of this pre-operational experience and our start-up
and operating experience to date, several features of the
control system were brought to light which require modifi
cation or correction,
ELECTROMAGNETS
As mentioned previously, the two level safety
channels, in conjunction with the period safety channel
which derives its signal from the log N-period channel,
function to shut the reactor down by dropping all safety
) rods whenever the power level increases beyond a preset
value and/or an abnormally short period occurs.
In each level safety channel, a POP (Parallel
Circular Plate) ionization chamber supplies a current pro
portional to the reactor power level to composite safety
amplifiers whose components include a preamplifier, a sigma
amplifier, and a magnet amplifier arranged on a single
chassis0 Since the current produced by neutron flux at
high levels of operation is much greater than that produced
by gamma radiation or other sources, this chamber is not
compensated
The output of the POP chambers and the output of
the log N channel are fed to preamplifiers in the composite
safety amplifiers0 The preamplifiers, in turn, feed into
sigma amplifiers whose outputs are supplied to a bus, referred
to as the sigma bus. This bus serves as the input to ail
three magnet amplifiers, each of which supplies the current
to an electromagnet which holds a shimsafety rod0
When the siala from the two PCP ionization
chambers or from the period channel are normal, the sigma
amplifiers maintain the potential of the sigma bus at a
prescribed level0 However, if the positive period should
become abnormally short, or if the power level should become
dangerously high, the sigma bus potential iS increased,
which causes the magnet current in all three magnet amplifiers
and, therefore, In the three electromagnets to be quickly
reduced, thus dropping all three safety rods into the reactors
The system is so desi,ed that the same result
is achieved if the sigma bus potential should decrease for
any reason, Since the sna bus is connected to the input
of each magnet amplifier, a scram may be initiated auto
matically by any one of the three safety channels.
it is iniportant to note that the magnet currents
are reduced by a given amount under scram conditions of 150
per cent of full power or a 5 second period. To assure that
the shim safety rods are released at these values, the reduced
currents must be slightly less than the release or “drop”
currents for wagnetrod combinations0 Therefore, in setting
up the safety system, synthetic scram signals are fed to the
system and the magnet currents adjusted to their “drop values,”
Upon removal of the synthetic scram signals, the magnet currents
til1 increase to values which are the maximum permissible
values to assure a scram by the safety amplifier at the level
and period intended, The maximum current is the “hold”
current available for raising the rods during tartup and
holding the rods during power level operation0 Naturally,
with a safety system of this type, it is absolutely necessary
to have reproducible “drop currents” in order to scram at
the specified level and/er period and, during normal operation,
have a holding farce considerably above that required to
hold the rods reliably0. If the holding forces are only
slightly greater than that required to hold the rods, spurious
shutdowns will occur because of vibration, slight misalignments
of guide tubes and minor electrical power fluctuations0 To
date, we have experienced unnecessary shutdowns which we
feel are attributable to the electroniagnets The tIdrop
currents vary as a function of the hold currents, implying
that our electromagnets are not operating in the saturation
portion of the hysteresis loop. What is needed, are magnets
designed to operate at saturation to assure reproducibility
of the drop currents and which would also have large
holding forces for normal operation. Such magnets would then
provide ±or continuity of normal power level operation and
reliable shutdowns under certain abnormal conditions0
Another important feature of electromagnet per
forwance in a reactor safety system that requires closer
attention is the ability of the magnets to release the rods
in a minimum time. Tests on the Ford Nuclear Reactor system
indicate that if the magnet currents are rapidly reduced to
well below the drop currents, the time required for the magnets
to release the safety rods is about 50 milliseconds This
magnetrod release time is many times greater than the total
of all other safety system delays. E1ectromagnetrod com
binations having releasó times of about 10 milliseconds while
retaining the advantages of high holding farces and reproducible
drop currents are needed for reactor safety systems which
employ safety concepts similar to those for the FNR.
The magnetrod release time measurements were made
using a technique developed by L. C. Oakes6 of the Oak
Ridge National laboratory wherein a fixed amplitudes variable
width voltage pulse is impressed on the sigma bus of the
syste!nr. By slowly increasing the pulse width, a width is
reached which raises the sia bus to the scram level for
a sufficient length of time that the electromagnets release
the safety rods0 This pulse width, at which the rods drop,
then is a measure of the magnet—rod release time0
The measurement of magnet-rod release times as a
function of rod positions proved very helpful in aligning our
rod-magnet guide tubes0 When the guide tubes were out of
alignment, thus disturbing the air gaps between the magnets
and rods, the release times were found to be small and
variable with position. When properly aligned, however,
the release times were independent of rod position0 It
) should be noted that this alignment procedure would not be
valid for electromagnets having large holding forces0
SAFEPt SYSTEM INTERAGTIONS
As mentioned earlier, the safety channels of the
safety system are kept independent of the rest of the control
system in order to prevent interactions0 However, within
the safety system itself there is interaction because the
individual channels are all fed to a single point or bus0
Thus, if only one channel, say the period channel, experiences
an abnoal signal, this channel alone must drive the sigma
bus potential to the scram level while the other level
safety channels act as a load on the system0 This means
that the reactor period required to drive the system to the
scram condition w±ll be shorter than it would be if the other
n
channels were also experiencing abnormally high signals
This SSIEWfl€nu can also he used for other cases such as a
single level safety channel drivIng all the other channels
In the latter cases the reactor power level at which a scram
would occur would be higher than when all the channels are
driving the sigma bus. For the three channel system on the
FNR, variations of scram levels and periods of 20 30 per
cent have been observed
Because of this interaction, the period and the
level at which a reactor scram is required must be stated in
terms of the safety system conditions For the FNR, the
sazety crivaraa as scatec. on the basis of a sIngle channeL
Thus, the reactor is scrammed at a power level of 150 per
cent of full power if only one level safety channel is drIving
the sigma bus and at a 5 second period If the period channel
alone is driving the sig’ma hus If two or three channels are
driving the sigma bus sImultaneously, scram will occur at
less than 150 per cent of fun power and for a period longer
than 10 seconds This safety system interaction does not
compromise the protection offered the reactor but it does
require that a more precise Interpretation be placed on the
level and period for which the reactor is protected A more
ietailad investigation of this safety system interaction
has been ctone by others1, the results of which are expected
to he rublishad in the near future
START$JP INSThUMENPM’ION
During startup from source level up into the range
of the log N and linear instrumentation, the only information
available is from the pulse or logcountrate channel, At
present, no control or safety actIon is provided on the FNR
from this channel, hence, the full responsibility of control
In this range tails to the reactor operators Although this
is not expected to cause any particular difficulty in the
future, it is felt that some form of control and safety
action, such as inhibiting safety and control rod withdrawal
end automatic rundown, would be very desirable in this range,
Then, in[3trument control and safety action would be available
over the entire range or reactor operation from source
level to full power During atartup the mast valuable
information would be reactor period which would originate
from the 1og-countrete instruments4. it is our intention
to employ the ORNL Qi881 Ig count Rate Meter for this
purpose. During startup, rod withdrawal will be inhibited
for periods less than or equal to 30 seconds and rod insertion
will be initIated foe periods less than or equal to 15
seconds and automatic rundown, a safety action, will be
initiated for periods f 10 seconds or less
From our experience to date, wider range log-count
rate meters and log N amplifiers would be extremely helpful
since the overlap of the 1ogcountrate meter and the log N
J channel is by no means a certainty. The ranges of the Ford
Nuclear Reactor s 1og-count.rate meter and log N amplifier
ii
are 4 and 65 decades, respectively, and the range of operation
from source to full power is expected to be between 10 11
decades
INVESTIGATIONS AND M0DI’IcATIONS
As part of the nuclear engineering educational
and research program at the University of Michigan various
investigations relating to reactor control are planned0
At present, plans are underway for a thorough investigation
of electromagnets in an effort to optimize their design in
terms of the rather rigorous specifications placed on them as
reactor safety system components0 The statistical variations
of neutron populations at low levels as related to the measure
nent of reactor periods will be investigated, both analytically
and experimentally0 The problems of gamma compensation of
neutron detecto.s, as used on the PNR log N and linear
channels will he studied to determine the best principles
and techniq:.es of compensation0
Minor modifications of the FNR control system were
made prior to putting the reactor into operation0 Others, V
such as the utilization of period information for start-up
and servo control, will be made in the near future The
use of wider range instrumentation and dualsynchro rod
position indicators (instead of potentiometric position
indicators) will be investigated as will other details of
the control system0
Because the PN IS used both as an educational and
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research facility, consideration is being given to the design
of an instrument supervised startup control system which
will provide a greater degree of safety protection and minimize
operational errors., With such a system, the reactor would
always be safely brought up to power in an orderly fashion
without needless delay. The desi of a system of this
type is now underway., After the usual system checkout, the
startup will be accomplished by (1) the selection of the
desired power level for operation and (2) the selection of
the instrument mode of operation by the reactor operator.
The proposed system, similar to that used on the Geneva
Conference Reactor (GcR)8 is being designed using the following
criteria:
a) No additional instrumentation channels are
to be used0 This means, of course, for the FNR only one
pulse channel will be used instead of two as on the GCR0
b) A minimum number of components, such as relays,
recorder contact switches and meters are to be used, thereby
minimizing maintenance snd other operational problems0
c) The primary and secondary safety functions
of the FNR will not be compromised in any manner whatsoever.,
Thus, the instrument supervised startup will use only the
measuring channels, i se., Log N, LCR and Linear Level.,
d) There will be no automatic shimrod control
during power level operation0 Shiumiing will be done manually
by the reactor operator while the control rod is on servo
control,
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e) The instrument supervised start-up must provide
a greater margin of safety than a manual startup.
This will be the case since the instrument supervised
start-up requires continuous automatic cross referencing
of all the measuring channels. Further, by virtue of period
control on the pulse channel, an additional safety function
will be used. This is particularly significant since no
safety action is initiated from the pulse channel on the
present systems.
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